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NOTES 
RIGHT TO DIE-COURT REQUIRES CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE 
PATIENT'S INTENT TO TERMINATE LIFE-SUSTAINING 
PROCEDURES; HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT OF 1993 
CASTS NEW LIGHT ON OUTCOME. Mack v. Mack, 329 
Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993). 
For decades, the advocacy of groups supporting euthanasia, as 
well as the actions of those such as Dr. Kevorkian, have piqued the 
nation's awareness of the medical and ethical issues concerning the 
right to die. Due to the "constantly increasing power of science to 
keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person 
would want to inhabit it," I the right to die has begun to make 
inroads in our laws. Legislatures across the nation have now ad-
dressed this issue and most states have laws protecting some version 
of the right to die. 2 Generally, the argument for the right to die is 
most persuasive in situations where a person ·is kept alive artificially 
against his will.3 
Before the enactment of the Health Care Decisions Act of 19934 
(HCDA), Maryland had two statutes governing who had the right to 
die, who could invoke this right, and under what circumstances. 
Maryland's Living Will StatuteS enabled an individual to write a 
declaration directing the withholding of life-sustaining procedures in 
the event of a terminal illness. In lieu of such a declaration, Mary-
land's Guardian Statute6 allowed an appointed guardian to determine 
I. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 227, 618 A.2d 744, 764 (1993) (McAuliffe, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring». 
2. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988); see also John Carroll 
Byrnes, The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993,23 U. BALT. L. REV. I, I n.l 
(1993). 
3. However, determining what that individual's wishes are or would be is suscep-
tible to much debate. In the case of perpetually unconscious patients, this 
determination arguably necessitates the deployment of a "fiction." See infra 
Part III; see also Byrnes, supra note 2, at 6 n.17. 
4. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994 and Supp. 1994) 
(formerly cited as Health Care Decisions Act, Chapter 372, Laws of 1993). 
5. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1991) (repealed and re-
enacted in its current form by Section I, ch. 372, Acts of Md. 1993). 
6. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -713 (1991) (amended to current 
form by Section 4, ch. 372, Acts of Md. 1993). 
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when to withhold a patient's medical procedures with court author-
ization.7 The right to die controversy clearly did not abate with the 
passage of these laws. Instead, the battleground merely expanded to 
include the judicial forum. 
Attention turned to the controversy in Mack v. Mack,8 which 
culminated with Maryland's highest court writing three separate 
opinions interpreting and applying Maryland's Guardian Statute.9 
Mack involved the disputed guardianship of a persistently vegetative 
patient. One of the potential guardians sought to have life-sustaining 
procedures terminated, the other did not. In Mack, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that there must be clear and convincing 
evidence of a patient's intent to refuse life-sustaining procedures, 
that this standard was not met by the facts of the case, and conse-
quently, that sustenance could not be removed. lO 
. While the decision in Mack established that a patient does have 
the right to refuse artificial sustenance, it also made clear that 
Maryland's laws were in need of revision. II Mack revealed certain 
inconsistencies in Maryland's law. For example, the Living Will 
Statute was narrower than the Guardian Statute in that it did not 
allow the withholding of artificial sustenanceP Mack required Mar-
yland courts to demand clear and convincing evidence13 of a persist-
ently unconscious patient's prior intent to terminate life-sustaining 
procedures before authorizing a guardian's decision to withhold life 
support. 14 This new standard of proof arguably limits the utility of 
the Guardian Statute. 
The decision in Mack soon caught the attention of the Maryland 
legislature. Ultimately, the enactment of the HCDA largely repealed 
and modified the statutes on which the decision in Mack was based. IS 
Under the new Advance Directives Statute,16 a surrogate may make 
decisions without court oversight unless another party petitions for 
an injunction. 17 Under the new Guardian Statute,18 a court may 
7. One of the crucial issues in Mack proved to be defining what court authorization 
requires. 
S. 329 Md. ISS, 618 A.2d 744 (1993). 
9. See infra notes 106-0S and accompanying text. 
10. Mack, 329 Md. at IS8, 61S A.2d at 744. 
11. [d. at 198, 222, 61S A.2d at 749, 761. 
12. See, e.g., id. at 213, 61S A.2d at 756; see generally supra notes 5-6. 
13. Only four judges favored this standard, three judges would have adopted a 
more relaxed approach. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 19S, 61S A.2d 744 (1993). 
14. Mack, 329 Md. at 207, 61S A.2d at 754. 
15. See generally MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -61S (1994 and Supp. 
1994). 
16. [d. 
17. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-70S(c)(2) (1993 and Supp. 1994); accord 
Mack, 329 Md. at 239-40, 61S A.2d 769-70 (Chasanow, J., concurring in part 
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prospectively authorize certain guardians to make decisions regarding 
a patient's treatment without further court intervention into the 
decision making process. 19 Further, even if court authorization is 
necessary, clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent is 
only preferable, not necessary, and authorization may be based upon 
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's best interests.2o 
I. THE RIGHT TO DIE 
The terms "euthanasia" and "right to die" are often used in 
the same context. There are, however, some distinctions. As previ-
ously mentioned, the right to die generally attaches to situations 
where a person would be kept alive artificially, but for the fact that 
it is against the intent or best interests of that patient. 21 Euthanasia, 
on the other hand, is directed at ending life that is no longer 
beneficial, whether or not artificial means are used to prolong that 
life.22 The action associated with,the invocation of the right to die 
involves the removal of whatever artificial means are prolonging the 
life, and in some cases, arguably constitutes a passive form of 
euthanasia. 23 Passive euthanasia is less frequently sought by conscious 
patients as it may involve a relatively slow and painful death. In 
contrast, incurring death by an affirmative measure, such as poison-
ing, is known as active euthanasia, and can be invoked upon a 
conscious patient capable of consenting (termed assisted suicide), or 
upon perpetually unconscious subjects.24 In Maryland,25 as in most 
jurisdictions, euthanasia is prohibited.26 
and dissenting in part) (stating that "those closest to the patient, if unanimous, 
should be able to make the decision to terminate life support without judicial 
intervention"). 
18. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -713 (1993 and Supp. 1994). 
19. This is true only where the court considers it appropriate, unless there is a 
dispute between members of the same class. See infra Part IV. 
20. See MD. CODE ANN., EST & TRUSTS §§ 13-711 to -713 (1994 and Supp. 1994). 
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
22. Webster's Dictionary does not mention the life of the individual, only the 
death. It defines euthanasia as "the act or practice of painlessly putting to 
death persons suffering from incurable conditions or diseases." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (1971). 
23. This situation occurs specifically when the patient's life-sustaining procedures 
are terminated because it is found to be in his best interests, allowing a "good 
death." Cf. Byrnes, supra note 2, at 12. 
24. See generally Nancy W. Dickey, Euthanasia, A Concept Whose Time Has 
Come?, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 521 (1993); Eugenie Anne Gifford, Artes Moriendi: 
Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1550-51 
nn.21-27 (1993); Jim Persels, Forcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted Suicide; 
Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 
93 (1993); c. Ann Potter, Will the "Right to Die" Become a License to Kill? 
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The right to die has developed from both common-law theories27 
and through protections found in the United States Constitution.28 
The well-rooted, common-law doctrine of informed consent focuses 
on a patient's right of self-determination and gives rise to the right 
to refuse treatment even if that refusal makes death imminent. 29 The 
United States Constitution's protection of liberty embodied in the 
Fourteenth AmendmentJO and numerous state constitutional protec-
tions have also been held to engender a right to refuse treatment 
under the aegis of individual freedom from action by the state. JI 
There are different situations in which it is argued that a patient 
has the right to die. In instances where a patient is terminally ill and 
is kept alive by medical procedures, the right to die is most sacro-
sanctY If the patient is conscious and able to express his intent to 
refuse treatment, his right is most likely to be honored. 33 If, however, 
the patient is not terminally ill, or is not conscious and cannot 
express an intent to refuse treatment, the situation becomes compli-
cated as various philosophicaP4 and ethicaP5 problems arise. Deciding 
whether a persistently vegetative patient's treatment may be termi-
nated, and deciding who is to make that decision, are particularly 
troublesome issues. 
If a patient is perpetually unconscious, any known rights of 
prior self-determination and inviolability must be upheld. J6 As long 
The Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19 J. LEGIS. 31 (1993); David R. 
Schanker, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation, and the Health Care 
Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977 (1993). 
25. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1993) (prohibiting euthanasia and 
mercy killing). 
26. See Gifford, supra note 24, at 1545 n.4. 
27. For a discussion of Maryland's doctrine, see Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 
438-39, 379 A.2d 1014, 1018-19 (1977). 
28. See Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188,210-11,618 A.2d 744, 755-56 (1993) (citing 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278, 287, 304-
05, 331 (1990». 
29. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 270-71. But cf. 
Mack, 329 Md. at 210 n.7, 618 A.2d at 755 n.7. 
30. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 278-79. 
31. See Mack, 329 Md. at 210-11, 618 A.2d at 755 (citing numerous states that 
have found state and federal constitutional bases for the right to die). 
32. See Byrnes, supra note 2, at 8. 
33. The patient's conscious choice will likely be adhered to unless the patient is 
incompetent or another person's interest is involved. See Mack, 329 Md. at 
210 & n.7, 618 A.2d at 755 & n.7. 
34. The most salient philosophical issue is whether man can "play God." See, 
e.g., Byrnes, supra note 2, at 13. 
35. Primarily affected is the set of ethics associated with the medical profession 
and its inhering duty to provide aid. 
36. "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior 
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as a patient is deemed legally alive, the law will not discard the 
patient's known interests, even if that patient will never regain 
consciousnessY The quandary is in determining how to carry out 
the patient's wishes and protect those rights. Because the patient is 
unconscious, there exists no present intent to be ascertained. Either 
the individual's intent must be implied to provide an intent with 
which a judgment may be effected, or someone must be appointed 
to exercise a surrogate judgment. 
A. The Focus of the Right to Die Determination 
One way to determine that such a patient would wish to refuse 
treatment is to assess the totality of the evidence of the patient's 
intent" prior to incompetence. 38 The patient's, intent can be best 
demonstrated by a written living will expressly indicating a desire to 
refuse or terminate treatment under certain circumstances in the event 
of an inability to convey such wishes at that time. 39 If a living will 
is not available, then any prior statements or other circumstantial 
evidence can be used to determine the true intent of the patient with 
regards to receiving or withholding medical procedures. 40 This ap-
proach is often labelled as "substituted" judgment because the court 
substitutes either the patient's past intent or a construction thereof 
in place of a present intent.41 The problem with the substituted 
judgment approach is that in many cases it is difficult to find enough 
clear evidence of a patient's intent regarding continuation of proce-
dures to satisfy the requisite standard of proof.42 
decisions." 'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 
(1990). 
37. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. on Behalf of O'Connor, 531 
N .E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (refusing to accept less than the patient's clearly 
expressed intent before permitting a surrogate to exercise the patient's right to 
refuse treatment). 
38. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 272. 
39. Under Maryland's former living will law, there were restrictions as to which 
procedures could be refused pursuant to this instrument. The statutory living 
will suggested use of the following language: 
I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I 
be permitted to die naturally with only the administration of medi· 
cation, the administration of food and water, and the performance 
of any medical procedure that is necessary to provide comfort, care 
or alleviate pain. 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1991) (repealed 1993); cj. MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994 and Supp. 1994) ("Suggested Forms") 
(reprinted infra note 147). 
40. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 215, 618 A.2d 744, 758 (1993). 
41. Id. at 214-15,618 A.2d at 757. 
42. Further, in the su bjective analysis, there is an inherent degree of fiction 
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Alternatively, medical decisions can be made for the patient by 
a "surrogate," such as a court appointed guardian. 43 Under this 
approach, the patient's personal intent may be expressed by the 
surrogate, who is presumed to best know what the patient would 
have wanted. 44 In lieu of knowledge of the patient's intent, the 
surrogate may base a decision on an assessment of the patient's 
subjective best interests. 45 The surrogate judgment approach is criti-
cized because a surrogate has the power to disregard or neglect what 
the patient would have wanted, and instead base a decision on his 
own considerations. 46 
Another possible approach is to make an assessment of the 
patient's condition based upon more objective criteria to determine 
what is the patient's "best interests. "47 Under this approach, a court 
makes a judgment as to the patient's quality of life, based upon 
factors such as the cost of treatment and the impact upon the family.48 
The main criticism of this objective approach is that a court, rather 
than interested parties, determines whether a particular life is worth 
continuing.49 This approach creates a slippery slope that inevitably 
leads to a broadening of the relevant considerations to include, and 
even predominate, the cost to society of maintaining lives of patients. 
To varying degrees, a subjective analysis also incorporates certain 
objective factors, and vice versa. Regardless of which approach is 
chosen, the pertinent criteria and analyses overlap. What may be 
dispositive in one approach may initially seem irrelevant in another, 
yet such a factor may enter into the analysis indirectly anyway-
one's best interest is largely evolved from subjective intent, and 
conversely, one usually intends to have done what is in one's best 
interest. 
regarding the patient's intent. Because the patient is unconscious, whatever 
intent is construed is inaccurate in that it lacks the impact that being in the 
situation would actually have had on the patient. Facing death may awaken 
the survival instinct in even the most cynical individual. On the other hand, 
experiencing the realities of an undignified existence can weaken even the most 
stubborn. Nevertheless, for a patient that is, by definition, incapable of forming 
intent, it can be argued that "no intent" is the most accurate approximation. 
43. Of course, to the degree that this process is overseen by a court, it ceases to 
be true surrogacy because it is the court that makes the real substituted 
judgment. 
44. Mack, 329 Md. at 214, 618 A.2d at 757. 
45. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 272 (1990). 
46. See Mack, 329 Md. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757 (the court emphasized that 
"the 'substituted judgment' label is a misnomer"). 
47. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 272. 
48. The Maryland Guardian Statutes do not look to factors such as financial cost 
or impact on the family. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1994) 
(setting forth certain "standards" for the surrogate to consider). 
49. Mack, 329 Md. at 218, 618 A.2d at 759. 
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B. The Refusal of Artificial Sustenance 
Further complicating decisions to withhold treatment are the 
distinctions that are drawn between the types of aid that can be 
administered to or refused by the patient. Artificial treatments are 
seen as the most invasive to a person's sanctity and right to self-
determination,50 and therefore, have been the most susceptible to the 
right to refusal. In reality, however, there is a spectrum of treatments 
and a continuous gradation in the level of "artificiality" of those 
treatments. 51 At one end of the spectrum are invasive surgical pro-
cedures to combat illness or disease, while at the other end is the 
mere providing of food and water. Defying facile characterization 
are procedures such as providing nutrition and hydration through a 
nasogastric tube or a gastrostomy.52 
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of refusing medical aid, including artificial nutrition and hydration. 53 
The decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health54 
concluded that there is a constitutional right, based on the Liberty 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to refuse artificial nutrition 
and hydration,ss Nancy Cruzan, the patient, was left in a persistent 
vegetative state following a car accident. 56 Medical experts testified 
at trial that she was not terminally ill, and could live for another 
thirty years. 57 Years after consenting to the implanting of a gastros-
tomy tube, Nancy's guardians sought its removal. 58 The controversy 
made its way to the Missouri Supreme Court, which found an absence 
of clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's wishes regarding what 
decision she would have made. 59 The court held, therefore, that given 
Missouri's strong interest in preserving life, sustenance could not be 
withdrawn.6o 
50. Such measures have beert regarded by some._Christian faiths as unnatural, and 
thus, able to be refused. Undoubtedly this has greatly influenced the common 
law as well as statutory right to die provisions. See, e.g., Wendy Ann Kron-
miller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 
MD. L. REV. 1188,1193-94 & nn.37-44 (1988). 
51. [d. 
52. This involves a surgical procedure to insert a line directly into the stomach. 
See generally Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and 
Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (1983). 
53. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 278-81. 
56. Id. at 265. 
57. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988). 
58. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 265. Lester and 
Joyce Cruzan, Nancy's parents, were her co-guardians. 
59. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411. Nancy's parents testified that Nancy 
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Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed this deci-
sion, it recognized that "a competent person has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"61 
and "assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a 
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition. "62 The Court also recognized the validity 
of a state's "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life,"6$ 
which may be manifested "through the imposition of heightened 
evidentiary requirements."64 While the Court noted that the case did 
not turn on the existence of a protected liberty interest, a majority 
of the Justices clearly stated that the right exists, and that it similarly 
extends to artificial nutrition and hydration.65 
C. Standards oj Evidence 
Associated with the determination of which factors 66 should be 
the focus of the right to die analysis is the question of what 
evidentiary standard should be applied in assessing these factors. 67 
Cruzan established that states may constitutionally require clear and 
convincing evidence of a patient's wishes in determining whether to 
had a "somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend that if she 
were sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could 
live at least halfway normally." Id. at 433 (trial court judgment reprinted in 
dissenting opinion). 
60. Id. at 424-25. 
61. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 278. 
62. Id. at 279. Interestingly, the court did not indicate that this right stems from 
a right to privacy, as some commentators had expected. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die, " 49 MD. L. REV. 103 (1990). 
63. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 282. 
64. Id. at 282. 
The more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more 
that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision. We believe that 
Missouri may permissibly place an increased risk of an erroneous 
decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's 
life-sustaining treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate re-
sults in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent 
developments such as advancements in medical science, the discovery 
of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or 
simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration 
of life-sustaining treatment at least create the potential that a wrong 
decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An 
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is 
not susceptible of correction. 
Id. at 283. 
65. Id. at 279. 
66. See supra Part I.A. 
67. Sometimes, however, the determination of which standard of proof is appro-
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terminate life support. 68 Indeed, most state courts require that these 
life and death determinations be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence of the relevant facts.69 The relevant facts may include the 
terminal or "end-stage" nature of the patient's condition, the pa-
tient's past expressions of intent or preferences, and the patient's 
overall condition and best interests. 7o However, evidence of prior 
expressions of the patient's intent is not always required.71 Only two 
states require clear and convincing evidence of past expressed intentY 
priate has been confused with the selection of fa~tors to which the standard is 
to apply. This confusion leads to a choice between clear and convincing evidence 
of prior intent and it determination of the patient's best interests, presumably 
with a preponderance of the evidence standard. The majority opinion in Mack 
is an example of this dubious comparison. 
68. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 282-84. Cruzan 
does not mandate that states use this standard of proof. Id. at 283; see, e.g., 
In re Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1271, 1272 n.19. (Mass.), cert. 
denied sub nom., Doe v. Gross, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992) (Massachusetts uses a 
preponderance of the evidence standard accompanied by an extra measure of 
evidentiary protection provided by "specific findings of fact after 'a careful 
review of the evidence."'). 
The states that have addressed this issue have defined the relevant consid-
erations and evidentiary standards with both statutes and case law. An example 
of a fairly explicit statute is Maryland's new Health Care Decisions Act. See 
infra Part IV; see generally Byrnes, supra note 2. 
69. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 208, 618 A.2d 744, 754 (1993). Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, upheld the constitutionality of this require-
ment, as long as it is supported by a valid state interest, such as the preservation 
of life. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-84. Missouri's standard of proof, upheld in 
Cruzan, is more rigid, however, than that in most states. See infra note 72. 
70. See Mack, 329 Md. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758. 
71. DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Ky. 1993). 
72. Id. 
In all but two states, Missouri and New York, even when the court 
has been unable to precisely determine the express wishes of the 
patient, it has allowed the patient's family, or the patient's guardian, 
to exercise substituted judgment as to what the patient would wish .... 
[Missouri and New York] require clear and convincing evidence thilt 
the incompetent person, while competent, expressed the desire that 
such treatment be refused in the circumstances presented. 
Id. (citations omitted). Other states have developed their own set of criteria. 
See, e.g., In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
The three tests established by the Court are as follows and apply to 
an elderly, formerly competent but presently incompetent nursing-
home resident with severe and permanent mental and physical im-
pairments .and a life expectancy of one year or less. Under the 
"subjective" test, when it is clear that the patient would have refused 
the treatment under the circumstances involved, life-sustaining treat-
ment may be withheld or withdrawn from the patient. The limited-
objective test applies when the patient has not unequivocally expressed 
his desires before becoming incompetent. Here, life-sustaining treat-
ment may be withheld or withdrawn from a patient when there is 
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D. Statutes Governing the Right to Die 
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan; the right 
to die controversy continued to draw much attention in state legis-
latures and courts. Most states already had laws providing for living 
wills73 and surrogate decision making,74 but Cruzan provided direction 
to the dialogue in state legislatures. In Maryland, the area of law 
governing the right to die has seen constant legislation and amend-
ment in the past few years. The two statutes that were applicable in 
Mack v. Mack, both now substantially repealed or modified, were 
known as the Living Will Statute and the Guardianship Statute. 75 
Maryland's Living Will Statute, formerly sections 5-601 through 
5-614 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland Code, enacted 
in 1985, enabled anyone qualified to write a will to also write a 
declaration directing the withholding of life-sustaining procedures in 
the event of a terminal illness. 76 This law, explicitly precluded, 
however, application to declarations to withhold "food, water, or of 
such medication and medical procedures as are necessary to provide 
comfort, care and to alleviate pain. "77 At the same time, the law 
provided that it was "cumulative and may not be construed to impair 
some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the 
treatment and the decision maker is satisfied that it is clear that the 
burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh 
the benefits of that life for him and that the treatment would merely 
prolong the patient's suffering. Under the "pure-objective" test, ap-
plicable when there is no trustworthy evidence that the formerly 
competent patient would have declined the treatment, the net burdens 
of the patient's life with the treatment should clearly and markedly 
outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life. 
Id. at 1259 (citations omitted); see also In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d. 1264 (III. 1993). Further, some 
states will apply the best interests test in the case of patients who were never 
competent to express an intent. See In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 639 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
[A]s applied to immature minors and other never-competent patients, 
the substituted judgment standard is inappropriate because it cannot 
be ascertained what choice the patient would have made if competent. 
We therefore conclude that, where the patient has never been com-
petent, the decision-making test that better guides the surrogate is the 
best interests standard. 
Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted). 
73. See generally JONATHON J. RIKOUN, HANDLING YOUR FIRST HEALTH CARE 
PROXY, LIVING WILL, AND DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY (1992) (Practicing 
Law Institute). In 1992, 45 states had statutes that recognized some form of a 
living will. Id. 
74. See generally GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN AUTHORIZING 
OR WITHHOLDING LIFE SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT (1991). 
75. See Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 212, 618 A.2d744, 756 (1993). 
76. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(a) (1990) (repealed 1993). 
77. Id. § 5-605(1) (repealed 1993). 
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or supersede any legal right or responsibility that any person may 
have to effect the initiation, continuation, withholding, or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining procedures. "78 
Opinions by Maryland's Attorney General construed this statute 
to be self-executing only with regard to terminal illness and life-
sustaining procedures other than food and water. 79 Those opinions 
also acknowledged a person's constitutional right to refuse suste-
nance.80 The Attorney General's opinions indicated that a declarant 
could add language to a living will regarding the withholding of 
treatment under other conditions, including the withholding of arti-
ficially administered food and water. 81 
Maryland's Living Will Statute82 was only applicable where a 
patient had the foresight to write a living will; as a result, Maryland's 
Guardianship .Statute was pertinent to most cases.83 This statute 
provided for the appointment of a guardian for certain patients,84 
and allowed guardians to determine whether to withhold or withdraw 
medical or other professional care, including counselling, treatment~ 
or service.8s However, the guardian's decision was subject to court 
approval if the course of action chosen involved a substantial risk 
to the patient. 86 
Both laws were amended in 1990, and in contrast to the 1988 
amendment to the Living Will Statute87 that explicitly precluded 
78. 'd. § 5-610(1) (repealed (993). 
79. 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 162, 180-83 (1988). 
80. 'd.; see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 
(1990). 
81. Op. Md. Att'y Gen., No. 90-044 (Sept. 24, (990) (unbound). 
82. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN., §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990) (repealed (993). 
83. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -710 (1990) (repealed (993). 
84. 'd. § 13-705(a). Former § 13-705(b) set forth the grounds required for appoint-
ment: 
A guardian of the person shall be appointed if the court determines 
from clear and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible deci-
sions concerning his person, including provisions for health care, 
food, clothing, or shelter, because of any mental disability, senility, 
other mental weakness, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to 
drugs, and that no less restrictive form of intervention is available 
which is consistent with the person's welfare and safety. 
'd. § 13-705(b). Former § 13-707(a) accorded priorities of appointment to: "(I) 
a person, agency, or corporation nominated by the disabled person ... ; (2) 
His spouse; and (3) His parents." 'd. § 13-707(a). 
85. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b)(8)(ii), (iii) (1991) (amended 1993). 
86. Former § 13-708(c) provided: 
[WI here a medical procedure involves, or would involve, a substantial 
risk to the life of a disabled person, the court must authorize a 
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termination of artificial sustenance, the 1990 amendment expressly 
allowed the guardian to approve the withholding of treatment, but 
was silent on the issue of sustenance.88 Until Mack, however, no 
cases had construed whether the 1990 amendment meant that suste-
nance could be terminated by either a living will or court authori-
zation. 
II. THE INSTANT CASE 
Due to the ambiguity of the Guardianship Statute, it was not 
surprising that the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari 
in Mack. 89 Ronald Mack was born in 1962 and, in 1980, married his 
wife, Deanna. 90 In 1983, while stationed in California with the Army, 
Ronald was "involved in an automobile accident in which he suffered 
massive brain injuries. "91 He was thereafter in a persistent vegetative 
state, totally "incapable of cognitive activity. "92 Ronald's arms and 
legs were moderately spastic, and he was incontinent. 93 A tracheotomy 
was performed to remove secretions from his lungs, and he had to 
be fed through a gastrostomy tube. 94 Ronald, however, was not 
experiencing pain. 95 
In 1983, Ronald was moved from California to a hospital in 
Maryland in order to be near his family.96 The next year, Deanna 
guardian's consent or approval for: 
(1) The medical procedure; 
(2) Withholding the medical procedure; or 
(3) Withdrawing the medical procedure that involves, or would 
involve, a substantial risk to the life of the disabled person. 
MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (1990) (amended 1993). 
87. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1988) (amended 1990). 
88. An opinion of the Maryland Attorney General noted: 
As amended by this statute, MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-
708(b)(8) now expressly empowers a guardian to approve the 'with-
holding' or 'withdrawing' of 'medical or other professional care, 
counsel, treatment or service.' However, 'where a medical procedure 
involves, or would involve, a substantial risk to the life of disabled 
person,' the guardianship court must itself 'authorize a guardian's 
consent or approval for' a procedure, the withholding of a procedure, 
or the withdrawing of a procedure. 
Op. Md. Att'y Gen., No. 90-044 (Sept. 24, 1990) (unbound). 
89. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993). 
90. [d. at 191, 618 A.2d at 746. 
91. [d. at 192, 618 A.2d at 746. 
92. [d. The circuit court found "no medically reasonable expectation of recovery." 
[d. at 192-93, 618 A.2d at 746-47. 
93. [d. at 192, 618 A.2d at 746. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. at 193, 618 A.2d at 747. 
96. [d. at 192, 618 A.2d at 747. 
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was appointed Ronald's guardian in Maryland and moved to Florida 
where she lived with another man for about five years. 97 Deanna 
then sought and obtained appointment as guardian by· decree of a 
court in Florida, and was discharged under the Maryland appoint-
ment.98 In 1991, Deanna expressed an interest in having Ronald's 
treatment terminated.99 Soon thereafter, Ronald's father, Mr. Mack, 
filed an application with the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland for a temporary restraining order preventing 
Deanna from moving Ronald to a hospital in Florida. 100 A preliminary 
injunction was entered and Mr. Mack then petitioned the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County to have himself appointed as Ronald's 
guardian. 101 Deanna cross-petitioned for guardianship and requested 
termination of Ronald's sustenance. I02 The circuit court ruled that 
the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to appoint Ronald's guardian 
and instead appointed a temporary guardian pending trial. 103 
At trial, the circuit court resolved the issue of guardianship and 
the termination of sustenance. The court appointed Mr. Mack as 
Ronald's guardian,l04 and found that there was no clear and con-. 
vincing evidence of Ronald's intent to have sustenance terminated. 
The court held, therefore, that sustenance could not be withdrawn 
at the request of the guardian. 105 
.. On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
agreed that the Florida court's appointment of a guardian was 
invalid. 106 The court also vacated the appointment of Mr. Mack as 
Ronald's guardian, finding that the appointment had been based on 
erroneous criteria. 107 The majority upheld the lower court's denial of 
the request to withhold life support. I08 Nonetheless, the majority 
97. [d. at 193, 618 A.2d at 747. 
98. [d. at 193-94, 618 A.2d at 747. 
99. [d. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747. 
100. [d. 
IO\. [d. 
102. [d. at 195, 618 A.2d at 748. 
103. [d. at 194-95,618 A.2d at 747. The circuit court appointed Edward J. Gilliss, 
Ronald's counsel, as a temporary guardian. [d. at 195,618 A.2d at 747. 
104. Despite Deanna's higher priority under former § 13-707(a), she was not 
appointed as guardian. The appointment was based primarily on Deanna's 
desire not to continue the administration of food and water, which the court 
found to be in contravention of the objectives of Maryland law. [d. at 196, 
618 A.2d at 748. 
105. [d. at 195-96, 618 A.2d at 748. 
106. [d. at 200, 618 A.2d at 750. 
107. The circuit court based the determination of guardianship on the fact that 
Deanna intended to withdraw Ronald's life support, ostensibly in contravention 
of the objectives of Maryland law. [d. at 196,618 A.2d at 748; see supra note 
104. 
108. Five judges refused to withhold life support. Judge Chasanow agreed with the 
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accepted a basis for the right to die that would aid in interpreting 
the statutory provisions at issue. This basis was supported by the 
common-law rights of informed consent lO9 and self-determination. llo 
A determination as to whether the right to die is based on the 
Constitution or on the common law was irrelevant to the court's 
decision. III The court cited other jurisdictions that similarly found 
no need to address the constitutional issue. 1I2 The court noted, 
however, that "all of the [the Supreme Court] Justices, save Justice 
Scalia, flatly stated or strongly implied that a liberty interest under 
the fourteenth amendment guarantees a protected right to refuse life 
sustaining hydration and nutrition. "113 
The court of appeals' holding that artificial sustenance could be 
refused or removed relied heavily on the Attorney General's opinion 
that "there is no difference, as a matter of law, between artificially 
administered sustenance and other forms of life sustaining treat-
ment." 114 The court distinguished the Guardian Statute from the 
Living Will Statute, which precluded the refusal of food and water. 115 
In light of the authorities, the court remarked that "absent a statutory 
exclusion" in former section 13-708, sustenance could be withheld 
or withdrawn under the Guardian Statute. 116 
Stating that "[t]he statute does not, however, supply the stan-
dards or guidelines for a court's exercise of the power to grant or 
withhold authorization," 117 the court recognized a common-law right 
to die analysis applicable to the procedural guidelines in former 
section 13-708. 118 The court then focused on establishing the proper 
guidelines and standards to be applied in right to die cases. 119 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that because the right 
to die was one of self-determination, a rule of "substituted judg-
ment" must apply, wherein the guardian or court supplies an incom-
petent patient's past intent regarding the withdrawal or withholding 
result, but dissented with respect to the standard employed by the other four 
judges. Mack, 329 Md. at 233, 618 A.2d at 766-67. Judge McAuliffe and Chief 
Judge Murphy dissented. [d. at 222, 618 A.2d at 761. 
109. [d. at 210, 618 A.2d at 755. 
110. [d. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757-58. 
111. [d. at 211, 618 A.2dat 756. 
112. [d. 
II 3. [d. 
114. [d. at 213, 618 A.2d at757 (quoting 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 179, 181 (1988». 
115. "[T]he unqualified language used by the General Assembly in the 1990 amend-
ment of [Estates & Trusts] § l3-708(b)(8) and (c) stands in stark contrast [to 
that of the living will statute]." [d. at 214, 618 A.2d at 757. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. at 212, 618 A.2d at 756. 
118. [d. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758. 
119. [d. at 215-17, 618 A.2d at 757-59. 
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of life support. 120 The court further determined that such substituted 
judgment must be based upon clear and convincing evidence of the 
patient's past intent. 121 The court applied this high standard of proof 
because it was utilized by the "overwhelming majority" of states. 122 
Applying that standard to the facts, the court affirmed the lower 
court's denial of authorization to withhold life support procedures.123 
Finally, the court rejected the proposed best interests standard, 
irrespective of the pertinent standard of proof. The court elaborated 
on the problems inherent in the best interests test,124 maintaining that 
the legislature did not intend for that standard to apply. 125 
The dissent, however, took issue with the clear and convincing 
standard as applied by the majority in the authorization of a guar-
dian's request to terminate life support. 126 First, the dissent argued 
that the substituted judgment approach "comes into play when the 
ward has made no prior statements bearing on the issue" of intentY7 
Second, the dissent argued that the court's analysis of the patient's 
intent was unnecessarily "limited to . . . the intent the ward may 
have formed when competent,"128 to the exclusion of other factors 
that should be taken into consideration in the absence of explicit 
expressions of intent. 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The court could have held that construing former section 13-708 
in para materia with former section 5-605 precluded the possibility 
of removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 129 The court recog-
120. Id. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757. 
121. Id. at 207-09, 618 A.2d at 753-55. The court likened the request to withdraw· 
or withhold life support to a request for punitive damages in a tort case, and 
a request for sterilization of an incompetent ward, both of which have been 
held subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 208, 618 
A.2d at 754. 
122. Id. at 208-09, 618 A.2d at 754-55. Curiously, the court cited New Jersey and 
Illinois as two of the jurisdictions that require "clear and convincing evidence 
that the ward's decision would have been to forego life support." Id. Clearly, 
that is incorrect. See supra note 72. 
123. Mack, 329 Md. at 217,618 A.2d at 759. "[The trial court's] fact findings are 
not clearly erroneous. This is a case in which we do not know what decision, 
if any, the patient had made or would make." Id. 
124. One such problem includes the theoretical fallacy in attributing any interests 
whatsoever to someone who is permanently unconscious. Id. at 220, 618 A.2d 
at 760 (citing 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 162, 189-90 (1988); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 
419, 425 (N.J. 1987». Another problem is the slippery slope potential of the 
best interests test. Id. at 221-22 n.ll, 618 A.2d at 761 n.ll; see also supra 
text accompanying notes 47-49. 
125. Mack, 329 Md. at 217-22, 618 A.2d at 759-61. 
126. Id. at 223-29, 618 A.2d at 762-65 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. at 223, 618 A.2d at 762. 
128. Id. at 228, 618 A.2d at 764. 
129. It should also be noted, on the other hand, that the court could have merely 
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nized the implications of Cruzan, however, and avoided basing its 
decision on a rule that would prove constitutionally challengeable. 
More confounding was the court's assertion that the Guardian 
Statute did not actually rely on the guardian's judgment in this 
paramount determination, but instead used the court's assessment of 
the patient's judgment. 13o Even accepting the proposition that the 
legislature intended the court, rather than the guardian, to make such 
determinations,131 the court's statement that the patient is entrusted 
to the court holds only partially true under the rule in Mack. 132 Only 
if the guardian invokes the court's oversight, by opting for the 
withholding or withdrawal of sustenance as opposed to initiation or 
continuation,133 is clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent 
allowed Florida to appoint Deanna as guardian. Sufficient contacts, however, 
is a well established requisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over the person. 
Such contacts were lacking in this case, as Ronald resided in Maryland. It may 
be argued that this rule could be surreptitiously avoided by merely attaining 
guardianship in Maryland and then moving the ward to another state to obtain 
the benefit of its laws. Although this too required court authorization, the 
guardian could be disingenuous as to his intent. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 13-708(b), (c) (1991) (amended 1993) ("The right to custody of the 
disabled person and to establish his place of abode within and without the 
State, provided there is court authorization for any change in the classification 
of abode .... "). 
,130. Mack, 329 Md. at 212, 618 A.2d at 756. "Ronald, as a ward of the court, is 
entitled to plenary protection of the court." [d. 
131. Indeed, a recent poll indicated that there is a clear consensus in America that 
the family should make the decision, rather than the court. 
An overwhelming 88 percent of Americans say the family should 
decide whether to end artificial life support when an individual is in 
a coma without hope of recovery and has left no instructions on 
personal wishes. Only 8 percent said doctors should make the decision; 
I percent said the courts should decide, and no one selected the state. 
[d. at 248, 618 A.2d at 774 (Chasanow, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (quoting M. Coyle, How Americans View High Court, NAT'L L.J., 
Feb. 26, 1990, at 36). 
132. The court later admitted this inconsistency in its opinion: 
From the standpoint of initiating a request to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment, the judgment of the guardian or applicant for guardianship 
is truly substituted for that of the ward. But, from the standpoint of 
whether the treatment is to be withdrawn, the "substituted judgment" 
label is a misnomer. The judgmept of the guardian is not accepted 
by the court in lieu of the judgment of the ward. Rather, because the 
right is one of self-determination, the inquiry focuses on whether the 
ward had determined, or would determine, that treatment should be 
withdrawn under the circumstances of the case. 
[d. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757. The clear implication is that the'right to self-
determination is not involved unless treatment is sought to be withdrawn. 
133. Initiation would tend to occur well before a court could take action to authorize, 
and continuation would ordinarily require no authorization. See infra note 162 
and accompanying text. 
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patient's intent required. To the contrary, the patient's intent could 
be ignored at the option of the guardian by not involving the court 
at all. As a result, the patient's intent would be carefully evaluated 
only under certain circumstances. If the guardian allowed treatment 
to continue against the patient's intent, the court would not be 
involved. 134 Thus, the Mack court reduced the role of the guardian 
to an arbitrary invoker of judicial determinations as to the patient's 
treatment. 
The plain language of former section 13-708 provided that the 
court need only "authorize" the guardian's decision to withhold or 
withdraw sustenance. 135 If the legislature intended a full-blown evi-
dentiary determination, it would have so indicated. The term "au-
thorize" is defined as: "To empower; to give a right or authority to 
act. To endow with authority or effecting legal power, warrant, or 
right .... To permit a thing to be done in the future . ... "136 The 
court provided no cogent reason as to how the term "authorize" 
translated into a disenfranchising supervision of the guardian's de-
cisions. Indeed, in the case of an incompetent patient on life support, 
the provisions for the appointment of a guardian are meaningless 
because the court must make the ultimate decision anyway. More 
logically indicated by the word "authorize" would have been a 
determination by the court that the guardian has no improper motives 
in making a decision, and has a sufficient relationship to the patient 
to have developed a decision based on clear and convincing evidence, 
as is the case in other jurisdictions. 137 
Moreover, requiring clear and convincing evidence of a patient's 
prior intent was not implicit in the statute. 138 In fact, the test 
employed by the court unnecessarily focused upon the existence of 
evidence that is not likely to be present in many cases. The result is 
that anyone who left behind little memorable evidence of an opinion 
on the subject of a dignified death would have their case resolved 
134. Mack, 329 Md. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757. 
135. Id. 
136. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
137. See, e.g., In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
We therefore hold that, in general, judicial involvement in the decision 
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment on behal f of a minor 
or other incompetent patient need occur only when the parties directly 
concerned disagree about treatment, or other appropriate reasons are 
established for the court's involvement. 
Id. at 639; see also In re of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (although a decisi.on must be based on clear and convincing evidence, 
the surrogate makes the decision in an informal forum). 
138. See generally, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1991) (repealed 
1993); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -713 (1991) (amended 
1993). 
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the same way, despite their actual intent. It is arbitrary to ignore the 
hopelessness and severity of the condition and its effect upon the 
patient's family; indeed, it is illogical to regard these factors as 
irrelevant to the patient's putative intent. Certainly, the primary 
indicia should be any prior expressed intent of the patient, but a 
reasonable approach would also admit evidence of the current situ-
ation itself. It may be argued that by recognizing this, the objective 
best interests test is approximated in a case with sparse subjective 
indicia. That does not make the subjective test flawed, however, it 
merely points out its fictitious aspect-when the patient is perpetually 
unconscious, subjective intent is non-existent. 139 
The court was correct in intimating that lawmaking is best left 
to the legislature;l40 nonetheless, by taking affirmative measures in-
stituting a "pro-life" bias, the court did effect a change in the law.141 
With its decision in Mack, the Court of Appeals of Maryland put 
the ball squarely in the legislature's court. 142 The legislature responded 
quickly, enacting the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 which 
became effective as of October 1, 1993. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE HCDA 
The preamble of the HCDA states: 
Whereas, the State is constitutionally permitted to enact 
reasonable safeguards to assure that health care decisions 
made by others or on behalf of an incapacitated patient are 
in keeping with the wishes of the patient or are in the best 
interests of the patient .... 143 
A. Advance Directives and Surrogate Decisions 
Section 5-602 of Maryland's Health-General Article allows a 
competent individual to make a written or oral advance directive to 
guide health care decisions in the event of incompetency.l44 Unlike 
the former Living Will Statute, the current provisions allow for the 
139. The test employed by the court depends on the fiction that the patient's past 
indications correspond to what he would want to do now. The court was 
unwilling to admit that a patient in a persistent vegetative state cannot have 
intent, although it may be constructed for him. There is no reason why the 
construction chosen in Mack would better vindicate the patient's rights than a 
broader or more objective assessment of his best interests. For a critical analysis 
of the variety of judgments employing this fiction, see Louise Harmon, Falling 
Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted JUdgment, 100 
YALE L.J. I (1990). 
140. Mack, 329 Md. at 198, 222, 618 A.2d at 749, 761. 
141. Jd. at 222, 618 A.2d at 760-61. 
142. The court held that the "'best interest' standard for withdrawal of life support 
involves a quality-of-life judgment which ... should be made only under 
guidelines established by the General Assembly." Jd. at 198, 618 A.2d at 749. 
143. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994). 
144. /d. § 5-602 (1994 and Supp. 1994). 
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refusal of nutrition and hydration.l45 Two model forms are suggested 
in section 5-603. 146 Form I is a Living Will. It provides a range of 
options concerning possible courses of treatment and suggests that 
the individual tailor these options to different circumstances. 147 Form 
II is comprised of two optional parts, the first directing the appoint-
ment of a health care agent to make decisions on behalf of the 
145. Id. § 5-601(m)(2) (1994) (stating that "a life sustaInIng proceuure includes 
artificially administering hydration and nutrition"). 
146. Id. § 5-603 (1994 and Supp. 1994). 
147. 
Form I 
Living Will 
(Optional Form) 
If I am not able to make an informed decision regarding my 
health care, 1 direct my health care providers to follow my instructions 
as set forth below. (initial those statements you wish to be included 
in the document and cross through those statements which do not 
apply.) 
a. If my death from a terminal condition is imminent and even· 
if life-sustaining procedures are used there is no reasonable expectation 
of my recovery- . 
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
except that, if 1 am unable to take food by mouth, 1 wish to receive 
nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ I direct that, even in a terminal condition, 1 be given· all available 
medical treatment in accordance with accepted health care standards. 
b. 1 flam in a persistent vegetative state, that is if 1 am not 
conscious and am not aware of my environment nor able to interact 
with others, and there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery 
within a medically appropriate period-
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ . 1 direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
except that if 1 am unable to take in food by mouth, I wish to receive 
nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ I direct that 1 be given all available medical treatment in accor-
dance with accepted health care standards. 
c. If 1 am pregnant my agent shall follow these specific instruc-
tions: _______________________ _ 
By signing below, I indicate that 1 am emotionally and mentally 
competent to make this living will and that 1 understand its purpose 
and effect. ... 
MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1994). 
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individual in the event of incompetency.148 The second part details 
148. 
Form II 
Advance Directive 
Part A 
Appointment of Health Care Agent 
(Optional Form) 
(Cross through if you do not want to appoint a health care agent to 
make health care decisions for you. If you do want to appoint an 
agent, cross through any items in the form that you do not want to 
ap!,ly.) 
(I) I, , residing at ______ _ 
appoint the following individual as my agent to make health care 
decisions for me 
(Full Name, Address, and Telephone Number) 
Optional: If this agent is unavailable or is unable or unwilling to act 
as my agent, then I appoint the following person to act in this capacity 
(Full Name, Address, and Telephone Number) 
(2) My agent has full power and authority to make health care 
decisions for me, including the power to: 
a. Request, receive, and review any information, oral or written, 
regarding my physical or mental health, including, but not limited to, 
medical and hospital records, and consent to disclosure of this infor-
mation; 
b. Employ and discharge my health care providers; 
c. Authorize my admission to or discharge from (including 
transfer to another facility) any hospital, hospice, nursing home, adult 
home, or other medical care facility; and 
d. Consent to the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of 
health care, including, in appropriate circumstances, life-sustaining 
procedures. 
(3) The authority .of my agent is subject to the following provisions 
and limitations: 
(4) My agent's authority becomes operative (initial the option that 
applies): 
__ When my attending physician and a second physician determine 
that I am incapable of making an informed decision regarding my 
health care; or 
__ When this document is signed. 
(5) My agent is to make health care decisions for me based on the 
health care instructions I give in this document and on my wishes as 
otherwise known to my agent. If my wishes are unknown or unclear, 
my agent is to make health care decisions for me in accordance with 
my best interest, to be determined by my agent after considering the 
benefits, burdens, and risks that might result from a given treatment 
or course of treatment, or from the withholding or withdrawal of a 
treatment or course of treatment. 
(6) My agent shall not be liable for the costs of care based solely on 
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in advance the specific health care instructions for that appointed 
agent to follow in such an event. 149 
149. 
this authorization. 
By signing below, I indicate that I am emotionally and mentally 
competent to make this appointment of a health care agent and that 
I understand its purpose and effect. ... 
MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1994). 
Part B 
Advance Medical Directive 
Health Care Instructions 
(Optional Form) 
(Cross through if you do not want to complete this portion of the 
form. If you do want to complete this portion of the form, initial 
those statements you want to be included in the document and cross 
through those statements that do not apply.) 
If I am incapable of making an informed decision regarding my 
health care, I direct my health care providers to follow my instructions 
as set forth below. (Initial all those that apply.) 
(I) If my death from a terminal condition is imminent and even 
if life-sustaining procedures are used there is no reasonable expectation 
of my recovery-
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
except that if I am unable to take food by mouth, I wish to receive 
nutrition and hydration artificially. 
(2) If I am in a persistent vegetative state, that is, if I am not 
conscious and am not aware of my environment or able to interact 
with others, and there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery-
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
except that if I am unable to take food by mouth, I wish to receive 
nutrition and hydration artificially. 
(3) If I have an end-stage condition, that is a condition caused 
by injury, disease, or illness, as a result of which I have suffered 
severe and permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and 
complete physical dependency and for which, to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty, treatment of the irreversible condition would be 
medically ineffective-
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ 1 direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures, 
except that if I am unable to take food by mouth, I wish to receive 
nutrition and hydration artificially. 
__ I direct that no matter what my condition, medication not be 
given to me to relieve pain and suffering, if it would shorten my 
remaining life. 
__ I direct that no matter what my condition, I be given all available 
medical treatment in accordance with accepted health care standards. 
(4) If I am pregnant, my decision concerning life-sustaining 
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Section 5-605 further allows a surrogate to make decisions re-
garding an incompetent patient's medical care, even if a health care 
agent was not nominated by the patient. 150 The surrogate is selected 
from an enumerated class l51 of the highest rank available. 152 "Any 
person authorized to make health care decisions for another under 
this section shall base those decisions on the wishes of the patient l53 
or, if the wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the 
patient's best interest."154 The factors to be considered by the sur-
rogate in these determinations are explicitly listed. 155 A health care 
provider may petition the court to prevent the withholding or with-
procedures shall be modified as follows: 
(5) I direct (in the following space, indicate any other instructions 
regarding receipt or nonreceipt of any health care) 
By signing below, I indicate that I am emotionally and mentally 
competent to make this advance directive and that I understand the 
purpose and effect of this document. ... 
MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1994). 
150. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (1994). 
151. Those classes are: "(i) A guardian for the patient, if one has been appointed; 
(ii) The patient's spouse; (iii) An adult child of the patient; (iv) A parent of 
the patient; (v) An adult [sibling]; or (vi) A [qualified] friend or other relative 
of the patient. ... " MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (1994). 
152. Section 5-605(a)(l) provides that the surrogate is unavailable when: 
(i) After reasonable inquiry, a health care provider is unaware of 
the existence of a surrogate decision maker; 
(ii) After reasonable inquiry, a health care provider cannot as-
certain the whereabouts of the surrogate decision maker; 
(iii) A surrogate decision maker has not responded in a timely 
manner, taking into account the health care needs of the indi vidual, 
to a written or oral message from a health care provider; 
(iv) A surrogate decision maker is incapacitated; or 
(v) A surrogate decision maker is' unwilling to make decisions 
concerning the health of the individual. 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (1994). 
153. The factors to be considered are: (I) the "current diagnosis and prognosis with 
and without treatment at issue"; (2) "expressed preferences regarding the ... 
treatment at issue or of similar treatments"; (3) "relevant religious and moral 
beliefs and personal values"; (4) behaviors and attitudes regarding medical 
treatment; (5) "reactions to ... similar treatment for another individual"; and 
(6) "expressed concerns about the effect on the family or intimate friends." 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(2) (1994). 
154. The considerations relevant to the patient's best interests are: (I) the effects 
of treatment on the disabled person; (2) the pain involved in withholding or 
withdrawing treatment; (3) the degree of insult to the patient's dignity caused 
by treatment or its withdrawal; (4) the effect of treatment on life expectancy; 
(5) the effect of treatment on the prognosis; (6) the risks and benefits of the 
treatment or its withdrawal; and (7) the religious beliefs and basic values of 
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drawal of a life-sustaining procedure if he believes such an instruction 
to be inconsistent with generally accepted standards of patient care.'56 
Others may petition the court to enjoin a request for withholding or 
withdrawal if such a request is not authorized by law.'57 
B. A Guardian's Decision Making 
The HCDA also significantly modified Title 13 of the Estates & 
Trusts Article. Section 13-707 now provides that the designated health 
care agent, as defined by title 5 of the Health-General Article, is 
second in priority in the appointment of a guardian.'58 Section 13-
708(c)(2) was added, providing that "the court may, upon such 
conditions as the court considers appropriate, '59 authorize a guardian 
to make a decision regarding medical procedures that involve a 
substantial risk to life without further court authorization," if the 
disabled person executed an advance directive allowing a guardian to 
make decisions, or if the guardian is a spouse, parent, adult child, 
or adult sibling of the disabled person.'60 In all other cases, "the 
court must authorize a guardian's consent or approval" for with-
drawing or withholding medical procedures that would involve a 
substantial risk to the patient's life.'6' Court authorizations are to be 
based upon clear and convincing evidence of what the patient would 
the patient.· MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(l) (1994). Neither the 
financial burden nor the impact upon the patient's family or loved ones are 
included among these factors. 
155. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(2) (1994). Two physicians must 
certify the incapacity of the patient, id. § 5-606(a), and two physicians must 
also certify that the patient is in a terminal condition, or has an end-stage 
condition, id. § 5-606(b). 
156. [d. § 5-612(a). 
157. [d. § 5-612(b). 
158. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-707(a)(2) (Supp. 1994). The highest 
priority remains an entity previously nominated by the patient to be a guardian. 
[d. § 13-707(a)(l) (1993 and Supp. 1994). 
159. This appears to leave the court with the discretion to ascertain whether the 
surrogate has ulterior motives, or to determine whether there is any other 
reason his judgment would not be trustworthy. 
160. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(2) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). 
Section 13-708(c)(l) was also modified to clarify that court authorization of 
the decision may not be necessary: "[EJxcept as provided in [§ 13-708(c)(2)], 
... the court must authorize the guardian's consent or approval." [d. § 13-
708(c)(l) (emphasis added). Although it could be interpreted that § 13-708 
(c)(3) requires the court to authorize, by engaging in its own analysis of the 
patient's wishes or best interests (following § 13-711 through § 13-713), all 
requests to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, such an interpre-
tation would render the addition of subsection (c)(2) and the modification of 
subsection (c)(l) meaningless and of no effect. Thus, subsection (c)(3) appears 
to invoke the court's oversight of the actual decision only when the exception 
in (c)(2) does not apply. 
161. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(l) (1993). 
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do if competent; 162 however, if this substituted judgment cannot be 
made, authorization may be based upon clear and convincing evidence 
of what is in the patient's best interests. 163 
C. Application to Mack v. Mack 
The HCDA bolstered individuals' ability to rely on others to 
appropriately act on their behalf in the event that they are unable 
to do so, thereby assuring a greater degree of prospective autonomy. 
Clearly, this has an impact on the potential future disposition of the 
Mack case. l64 Under the new law, Deanna Mack could proceed either 
under title 5 or 13 to make decisions regarding Ronald's treatment. 
Although Ronald never made an advance directive or appointed a 
health care agent, Deanna would be entitled to make surrogate 
decisions regarding his health care. Clearly, Deanna, as Ronald's 
wife, would have priority over Ronald's father in the decision making 
process. 165 Section 5-605(2) provides priority for the patient's guard-
ian; if there is no guardian appointed, the second choice is the 
patient's spouse, the third choice is an adult child, and the fourth 
choice is a parent. 166 
Deanna would be required to act upon Ronald's wishes, consid-
ering such factors as his expressions, beliefs, and attitudes regarding 
the treatment and other relevant issues. 167 If she found that his wishes 
were unclear, she could then base her decision upon a broader 
assessment of Ronald's best interests. 168 Although the evidence re-
garding Ronald's wishes was found to be ambiguous,169 the decision 
would still be Deanna's to make. At the least, she could base a 
decision to terminate procedures upon her intimate knowledge of 
162. Id. § 13-712(b) (Supp. 1994). The factors to be considered by the court in the 
substituted judgment are listed in § 13-711(d) and are essentially the same as 
those described in § 5-605(c)(2) for consideration of a decision by a surrogate. 
Id. § 13-711(d) (1993); see also supra note 153. 
163. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-713(a) (Supp. 1994). The considerations 
relevant to the patient's best interests are the same as those outlined in § 5-
605 (c)(2). See supra note 154; MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711(b) 
(Supp. 1994). 
164. Section 5-616 provides that the subtitle is "cumulative with existing law on the 
right to consent or refuse to consent to medical treatment and doles] not 
impair any existing rights." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-616(a) (1994). 
165. See supra note 151. 
166. There would thus be no dispute among members of a class with equal priority 
because Deanna would be the only member of that class, and Ronald's father 
would have lower priority under the statute. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 5-605(b)(l) (1994). 
167. See supra notes 153, 154. 
168. See supra note 154. 
169. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 217, 618 A.2d 744, 758-59 (1993). 
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Ronald and his best interests. Only upon petItIOn by a concerned 
party to enjoin the termination would a court become involved in 
assessing whether the provisions of the law authorized that termi-
nation, that is, whether the patient's wishes or best interests dictated 
that course of action. 170 Ronald's father could make such a petition. 
However, given the new guidelines, Ronald's situation, and Deanna's 
knowledge of Ronald, it would be difficult to justify denying her 
request. 
Alternatively, Deanna could invoke the revised Guardian Statute 
and make a decision regarding continuation of Ronald's treatment. 
Because Deanna is Ronald's spouse, she would come under the 
exception to court authorization in section 13-708(c)(2).171 Thus, 
Deanna would be authorized in advance to make a decision regarding 
medical procedures that could involve a substantial risk to Ronald's 
life, without further court authorization.172 Unless Deanna's motives 
for having Ronald's treatment terminated were questionable, there 
would appear to be no reason why a court should find such pro-
spective authorization inappropriate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ostensibly to avoid "legislating" in a controversial area,173 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Mack v. Mack,174 adopted an 
approach that deceptively allayed the court's fears of interfering with 
the patient's rights by ignoring those rights if the patient never clearly 
expressed the intent to choose a dignified end to his life. The court 
did provide, however, needed impetus and illustration for the legis-· 
lature in its fashioning of the HCDA. The legislature made it clear 
that requiring courts to authorize every decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining procedures was unnecessarily disenfranchis-
ing to those who could best make such decisions. Thus, only when 
there is a dispute, when the decision maker is not sufficiently close 
to the patient, or when that decision maker's motives or reliability 
are questionable, does the court intervene and impose its own judg-
ment. 
170. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(b) (1994). 
171. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(2) (Supp. 1994). 
172. [d. 
173. The court seemed to indicate that it might have affected such a change had 
there been a clear societal consensus: "[W]e are by no means confident that 
there exists on this quality-of-Iife question the degree of societal consensus that 
this Court ordinarily requires before announcing a change in the common 
law." Mack, 329 Md. at 219-20, 618 A.2d at 760. But see Coyle, supra note 
131. 
174. 329 Md. 188, 217 A.2d 744 (1993). 
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Moreover, the legislature found the requirement of clear and 
convincing evidence of past intent of the patient to refuse treatments 
to be unnecessarily restrictive. Under the new Advance Directive 
Statute, no mention is made of clear and convincing evidence. Under 
the revised Guardian Statute, when court authorization is necessary, 
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent is preferred but 
not necessary, and the court may base its decision on the patient's 
best interests. 
The HCDA responded to the complex challenge and debate 
underlying the laws that Mack interpreted. As a result, Maryland 
has taken a position of leadership in a crucial area, providing 
thorough, reasonable guidelines to focus on and protect its patients' 
wishes and best interests in life and death matters . 
. Thomas J. Brindisi 
